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44. NORTH SEA 
CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES 
Judgment o f 20 February 1969
The Court delivered judgment, by 11 votes to 6, in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases .
The dispute, which was submitted to the Court on 20 February 
1967, related to the delimitation of the continental shelf between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark on the one hand, and 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands on the 
other. The Parties asked the Court to state the principles and rules of 
international law applicable, and undertook thereafter to carry out the 
delimitations on that basis.
The Court rejected the contention of Denmark and the 
Netherlands to the effect that the delimitations in question had to be 
carried out in accordance with the principle of equidistance as defined 
in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 
holding:
-  that the Federal Republic, which had not ratified the 
Convention, was not legally bound by the provisions of Article 6;
-  that the equidistance principle was not a necessary consequence 
of the general concept of continental shelf rights, and was not a rule of 
customary international law.
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The Court also rejected the contentions of the Federal Republic in 
so far as these sought acceptance of the principle of an apportionment 
of the continental shelf into just and equitable shares. It held that each 
Party had an original right to those areas of the continental shelf which 
constituted the natural prolongation of its land territory into and under 
the sea. It was not a question of apportioning or sharing out those areas, 
but of delimiting them.
The Court found that the boundary lines in question were to be 
drawn by agreement between the Parties and in accordance with 
equitable principles, and it indicated certain factors to be taken into 
consideration for that purpose. It was now for the Parties to negotiate 
on the basis of such principles, as they have agreed to do.
The proceedings, relating to the delimitation as between the 
Parties of the areas of the North Sea continental shelf appertaining to 
each of them, were instituted on 20 February 1967 by the 
communication to the Registry of the Court o f two Special Agreements, 
between Denmark and the Federal Republic and the Federal Republic 
and the Netherlands respectively. By an Order of 26 April 1968, the 
Court joined the proceedings in the two cases.
The Court decided the two cases in a single Judgment, which it 
adopted by eleven votes to six. Amongst the Members of the Court 
concurring in the Judgment, Judge Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan 
appended a declaration; and President Bustamante y Rivero and Judges 
Jessup, Padilla Nervo and Ammoun appended separate opinions. In the 
case of the non-concurring Judges, a declaration of his dissent was 
appended by Judge Bengzon; and Vice-President Koretsky, together 
with Judges Tanaka, Morelli and Lachs, and Judge ad hoc S0rensen, 
appended dissenting opinions.
In its Judgment, the Court examined in the context of the 
delimitations concerned the problems relating to the legal regime of the 
continental shelf raised by the contentions of the Parties.
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The Facts and the Contentions of the Parties
(paras. 1-17 of the Judgment)
The two Special Agreements had asked the Court to declare the 
principles and roles of international law applicable to the delimitation 
as between the Parties of the areas of the North Sea continental shelf 
appertaining to each of them beyond the partial boundaries in the 
immediate vicinity of the coast already determined between the Federal 
Republic and the Netherlands by an agreement of 1 December 1964 
and between the Federal Republic and Denmark by an agreement of 9 
June 1965. The Court was not asked actually to delimit the further 
boundaries involved, the Parties undertaking in their respective Special 
Agreements to effect such delimitation by agreement in pursuance of 
the Court’s decision.
The waters of the North Sea were shallow, the whole seabed, 
except for the Norwegian Trough, consisting of continental shelf at a 
depth of less than 200 metres. Most of it had already been delimited 
between the coastal States concerned.
The Federal Republic and Denmark and the Netherlands, 
respectively, had, however, been unable to agree on the prolongation of 
the partial boundaries referred to above, mainly because Denmark and 
the Netherlands had wished this prolongation to be effected on the basis 
of the equidistance principle, whereas the Federal Republic had 
considered that it would unduly curtail what the Federal Republic 
believed should be its proper share of continental shelf area, on the 
basis of proportionality to the length of its North Sea coastline. Neither 
of the boundaries in question would by itself produce this effect, but 
only both of them together an element regarded by Denmark and me 
Netherlands as irrelevant to what they viewed as being two separate 
delimitations, to be carried out without reference to the other.
A boundary based on the equidistance principle, i.e., an 
“equidistance line”, left to each of the Parties concerned all those 
portions of the continental shelf that were nearer to a point on its own 
coast than they were to any point on the coast of the other Party.
In the case of a concave or recessing coast such as that of the 
Federal Republic on the North Sea, the effect of the equidistance
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method was to pull the line of the boundary inwards, in the direction of 
the concavity. Consequently, where two equidistance lines were drawn, 
they would, if the curvature were pronounced, inevitably meet at a 
relatively short distance from the coast, thus “cutting off” the coastal 
State from the area of the continental shelf outside. In contrast, the 
effect of convex or outwardly curving coasts, such as were, to a 
moderate extent, those of Denmark and the Netherlands, was to cause 
the equidistance lines to leave the coasts on divergent courses, thus 
having a widening tendency on the area of continental shelf off that 
coast.
It had been contended on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands 
that the whole matter was governed by a mandatory rule of law which, 
reflecting the language of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf of 29 April 1958, was designated by them as the 
“equidistance-special circumstances” rule. That rule was to the effect 
that in the absence of agreement by the parties to employ another 
method, all continental shelf boundaries had to be drawn by means of 
an equidistance line, unless “special circumstances” were recognized to 
exist. According to Denmark and the Netherlands, the configuration of 
the German North Sea coast did not of itself constitute, for either of the 
two boundary lines concerned, a special circumstance.
The Federal Republic, for its part, had contended that the correct 
rule, at any rate in such circumstances as those of the North Sea, was 
one according to which each of the States concerned should have a 
“just and equitable share” of the available continental shelf, in 
proportion to the length of its sea-frontage. It had also contended that in 
a sea shaped as is the North Sea, each of the States concerned was 
entitled to a continental shelf area extending up to the central point of 
that sea, or at least extending to its median line. Alternatively, the 
Federal Republic had claimed that if the equidistance method were held 
to be applicable, the configuration of the German North Sea coast 
constituted a special circumstance such as to justify a departure from 
that method of delimitation in this particular case.
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The Apportionment Theory Rejected
(paras. 18-20 of the Judgment)
The Court felt unable to accept, in the particular form it had 
taken, the first contention put forward on behalf of the Federal 
Republic. Its task was to delimit, not to apportion the areas concerned. 
The process of delimitation involved establishing the boundaries of an 
area already, in principle, appertaining to the coastal State and not the 
determination de novo o f such an area. The doctrine of the just and 
equitable share was wholly at variance with the most fundamental of all 
the rules of law relating to the continental shelf, namely, that the rights 
of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf 
constituting a natural prolongation of its land territory under the sea 
existed ipso facto  and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the 
land. That right was inherent. In order to exercise it, no special legal 
acts had to be performed. It followed that the notion of apportioning an 
as yet undelimited area considered as a whole (which underlay the 
doctrine of the just and equitable share) was inconsistent with the basic 
concept o f continental shelf entitlement.
Non-Applicability o f Article 6 o f the 1958 Continental Shelf
Convention
(paras. 21-36 of the Judgment)
The Court then turned to epe question whether in delimiting those 
areas the Federal Republic was under a legal obligation to accept the 
application of the equidistance principle. While it was probably true 
that no other method of delimitation had the same combination of 
practical convenience and certainty of application, those factors did not 
suffice of diem-selves to convert what was a method into a rule of law. 
Such a method would have to draw its legal force from other factors 
than the existence of those advantages.
The first question to be considered was whether the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf was binding for all the Parties in 
the case. Under the formal provisions of the Convention, it was in force 
for any individual State that had signed it within the time-limit 
provided, only if that State had also subsequently ratified it. Denmark
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and the Netherlands had both signed and ratified the Convention and 
were parties to it, but the Federal Republic, although one of the 
signatories of the Convention, had never ratified it, and was 
consequently not a party. It was admitted on behalf of Denmark and the 
Netherlands that in the circumstances the Convention could not, as 
such, be binding on the Federal Republic. But it was contended that the 
regime of Article 6 of the Convention had become binding on the 
Federal Republic, because, by conduct, by public statements and 
proclamations, and in other ways, the Republic had assumed the 
obligations of the Convention.
It was clear that only a very definite, very consistent course of 
conduct on the part of a State in the situation of the Federal Republic 
could justify upholding those contentions. When a number of States 
drew up a convention specifically providing for a particular method by 
which the intention to become bound by the regime of the convention 
was to be manifested, it was not lightly to be presumed that a State 
which had not carried out those formalities had nevertheless somehow 
become bound in another way. Furthermore, had the Federal Republic 
ratified the Geneva Convention, it could have entered a reservation to 
Article 6, by reason of the faculty to do so conferred by Article 12 of 
the Convention.
Only the existence of a situation of estoppel could lend substance 
to the contention of Denmark and the Netherlands -  i.e., if the Federal 
Republic were now precluded from denying the applicability of the 
conventional regime, by reason of past conduct, declarations, etc., 
which not only clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of that 
regime, but also had caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in reliance on 
such conduct, detrimentally to change position or suffer some 
prejudice. O f this there was no evidence. Accordingly, Article 6 of the 
Geneva Convention was not, as such applicable to the delimitations 
involved in the present proceedings.
